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ARTICLE
Constructing collective identities and solidarity in
premiers’ early speeches on COVID-19: a global
perspective
Martina Berrocal 1✉, Michael Kranert 2, Paola Attolino3, Júlio Antonio Bonatti Santos4,
Sara Garcia Santamaria5, Nancy Henaku6, Aimée Danielle Lezou Koffi7, Camilla Marziani 8,
Viktorija Mažeikienė9, Dasniel Olivera Pérez10, Kumaran Rajandran11 & Aleksandra Salamurović12
The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted a unique global experience, arousing both exclu-
sionary nationalistic and inclusionary responses of solidarity. This article aims to explore the
discursive and linguistic means by which the COVID-19 pandemic, as a macro-event, has
been translated into local micro-events. The analysis studies the global pandemic through the
initial statements of 29 leading political actors across four continents. The aim is to examine
discursive constructions of solidarity and nationalism through the social representation of
inclusion/exclusion of in-, out-, and affiliated groups. The comparative analysis is based on
the theoretical and methodological framework of the socio-cognitive approach to critical
discourse analysis and is informed by argumentation theory and nationalism studies. The
results of our analysis suggest that leaders have constructed the virus as the main outgroup
through the metaphors of the pandemic-as-war and the pandemic-as-movement which have
entered the national space. Faced with this threat, these speeches have discursively con-
structed the nation-as-a-team as the main in-group and prioritized (1) a vertical type of
solidarity based on nationhood and according to governmental plans; (2) exclusionary soli-
darity against rule-breakers; (3) horizontal solidarity that is both intergenerational and among
family members, and (4) transnational solidarity. It is not by chance that the world stands as
a relevant affiliated group that needs to forcibly collaborate in order to face the main out-
group, the virus itself. A major consensus has been found in constructing the out-group. In
contrast, the linguistic and discursive constructions of in-groups and their affiliates display a
greater variation, depending upon the prevalent discursive practices and social context within
different countries.
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Epidemics and pandemics are perennial transnational phe-nomena, as they had always spread through the increasinglyinterconnected world along with the networks of trade and
travel (Malm, 2020; Huber, 2020). In the COVID-19 pandemic,
however, this trend was realized on an unprecedented scale: the
spread of the virus affected nearly everybody and led to a ‘unique
shared experience’ (Bieber, 2020a, p. 1) because of the almost
simultaneous worldwide reaction of lockdowns and shutdowns.
This distinguishes it from other seemingly ‘global’ phenomena,
such as the financial crisis or previous epidemics which were
confined to one or more regions (e.g., Ebola, SARS, Zika). Within
three months, the pandemic developed from a Chinese public
health issue into a global health crisis.
The COVID-19 crisis is regarded as ‘a textbook example of
contemporary globalization processes’ (Blommaert, 2020), with
diseases spreading along with the mobile networks of the land, sea,
and air travel which facilitate globalization (see also Malm, 2020).
However, one of the most salient features common to most coun-
tries in the very first phase of the outbreak was the nation-oriented
reactions (e.g., closure of borders, restrictions of medical and social
aid within state borders), which challenged the concept of global
solidarity. These circumstances have made nationalism, in all its
nuances, an important concept in the discourse of the pandemic.
Notably, the concept of solidarity itself has become prominent, both
as opposed and linked to nationalism, and/or as a feature of renewed
global interrelations. Given this experiential uniformity, the question
arises of how such a general social phenomenon has been localized
by discursive means. To test how this macro-event has been trans-
lated into local micro-events and to highlight similarities and dif-
ferences, we have performed a comparative analysis of 29 countries
across four continents, grounded in Koller’s (2012, 2014) notions of
in-, out-, and affiliated groups.
Theory and method
We understand political discourse as collective decision making
(Klein, 2000, 2019; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012) in which a
course of political action needs to be legitimized on the basis of
common values and of a shared understanding of the situation
and the issue in question (Chilton, 2004). Importantly, it is not
only the course of action that is socially and discursively legit-
imized, but also the question of who can act on behalf of whom
and how socio-cognitive representations of political collective
entities such as states, nations, governments, and institutions are
discursively constructed and contested.
Discourses of COVID-19 are evidently crisis discourses, as they
concern a perceived threat to life (Gjerde, 2021, p. 7) which, as with
other pandemics, brings about emotional urgency and ‘elicits [an]
immediate and widespread response’ (Rosenberg, 1989, p. 1). Within
risk and crisis management communication, the crisis is defined as
‘the perception of an event that threatens important expectancies of
stakeholders’ (Coombs, 2010, p. 99). This perceived disruption or
violation of a specific order is then discursively constructed as a crisis
(Hay, 1996). There is a long tradition of discourse research on crisis
discourse, with work in discourse linguistics (Wengeler and Ziem,
2014), as well as in sociologically-oriented discourse analysis (Jessop,
2013) over the last decade focusing mainly on economic crises. In
critical event studies, normally linked to the field of event man-
agement, Montessori (2016, p. 132) extends the notion of critical
events to global political events, which are driven by media logic. In
critical realist fashion, she understands these events as existing
outside of discourse but nevertheless gaining significance through
discursive processes. Similarly to Jessop (2013), she warns that it
would be a mistake to see ‘events as isolated moments’ (Montessori,
2016, p. 144).
Zamponi and Bosi’s (2016) analysis of newspaper representa-
tions of the global financial crisis highlights its country-specific
manifestation, which reinforces Blommaert’s (2010) observation
that globalization does not lead to materially or linguistically
uniform structures (see also Blommaert, 2020). Every global cri-
sis, according to De Rycker and Don (2013, p. 19) is, therefore
‘the outcome of local events and trends in specific places and […]
is shaped by particular histories. To sum up, the available lit-
erature suggests that crises are discursively constructed events,
but this construction depends on socio-cultural and political
factors at a local level.
One of the salient values addressed and highlighted in the
COVID-19 crisis discourse is solidarity. Generally, solidarity is
conceived as an element that is essential for social structuring,
both on the interpersonal and intergroup levels. If, in line with
Durkheim (1984, p. 331), we consider solidarity to be the ‘totality
of bonds that bind us to one another and to society, which shape
the mass of individuals into a cohesive aggregate’, then solidarity
appears to be the basic feature of human interaction and has to be
discursively conceptualized accordingly. However, solidarity is
neither a homogeneous nor a stable concept. It displays numer-
ous varieties in regards to both form and structure and can
oscillate across different periods, such as times of quiescence and
times of crisis (Crow, 2010, p. 59). In addition, the linguistic
realizations of these varieties differ considerably across texts and
languages.
Starting with the discursive history of the concept, Bayertz
(1999) lists four interrelated dimensions of solidarity: human,
including family and blood ties; political, covering group active
interest ties; social, relating to feelings, history and cultural ties;
and civic, including economic or financial solidarity within a
welfare state. Norms of solidarity are mainly of a horizontal
nature (interpersonal and intergroup), but also involve a vertical
dimension (rulers–ruled). Some authors, therefore, distinguish
between institutionalized and informal solidarity (Kourachanis
et al., 2019, p. 680), the former referring to the state as the main
carrier of common interests and actions, with the latter pointing
to non-state-actors, such as NGO’s or family structures. Noting
the increasing individualization of postmodern societies, some
scholars speak about ‘solidaristic individualism’ (Rothstein, 2017,
p. 313) and ‘hidden solidarities’ (Spencer and Pahl, 2006),
referring to the rising relevance of informal social networks such
as friendships. Solidarity implies that people bond on the basis of
the same or at least convergent interests and/or emotions.
In view of solidarity as a complex phenomenon, we adopt the
proposal by Wallaschek (2020) to analyze solidarity as a
meaning-making process focusing on both its content enfolding
in discourse and the actors who are included in or excluded from
this content. Solidarity is a feature of group building, both in the
sense of community and society. Since individuals are members
of more than one group, various types of solidarity interlock, as
Bayertz (1999, p. 28) emphasizes. Nation, as an ‘imagined com-
munity’ (Anderson 1983), is one of these possible social groups.
In this vein, Malešević (2013, p. 14, 2020, p. 1) claims that soli-
darity is attached to nationhood, as ‘for an overwhelming
majority of inhabitants of this planet, nationhood is understood
to be the principal form of human solidarity’. In contrast, some
scholars have argued that global solidarity is generally being
questioned by the rise and strengthening of nationalism during
the COVID-19 pandemic, as the nation-oriented reactions to the
pandemic were a prominent recurrence during the initial crisis
management phase. This can be explained by the fact that
responsibility for public health lies with sovereign (nation) states
and that ‘the nation-state — the institution—is the gravitational
constant that determines politics’ (Ozkirimli, 2020). This reflects
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00805-x
2 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |           (2021) 8:128 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00805-x
the power of (nation-)states which are, according to Malešević
(2020), one of the main agents responsible for the unfolding of
the organizational power of nationalism.
As with solidarity, nationalism conceptually lacks both
homogeneity and clarity. Traditionally, scholars have dis-
tinguished between civic nationalism, linked to shared political
rights, and ethnic nationalism, tied to distinct cultural markers
such as language, religion, or ancestry (Smith, 1998). There is,
furthermore, a distinction between virulent, aggressive, or
exclusionary nationalism (Bieber, 2020b, p. 15) and banal (Billig,
1995) or latent (Bieber, 2020a, p. 15) forms of nationalism.
Importantly, these differentiations are not to be understood in
absolute terms since there is often a gradual transition and
overlaps between the forms. Therefore Bieber (2018, p. 521;
2020b, p. 14) suggests that nationalism is better understood
against the background of the interplay between levels and grades
of inclusion and exclusion, which are the two main principles in
constituting any group (van Dijk, 1998, p. 72). Within the dis-
course of COVID-19, a crisis has not only provoked the need to
mobilize the ‘image of communion’ (Anderson, 1983) between all
members who do not know each other but has initiated the
processes of discursive (re-)identification and (re)building of in-
groups and out-groups.
Furthermore, an analysis of the discursive construction of
solidarity must also be attentive to the ways in which the cor-
onavirus impacts nationalist constructions and performances in
political discourse. More than any event in recent history, the
COVID-19 crisis successfully highlights the complicated rela-
tionship between nationalism and transnationalism and has
increased the relevance of Bieber’s (2020b, p. 187) argument that
‘[w]hile nationalism appears to be the antithesis to globalization,
it is also closely intertwined with it’. Whilst efforts to curtail the
pandemic are more distinct and determined at the level of the
nation-state, as ‘it is states that have armed forces; control police;
mint currency; permit or refuse entrance to their lands; states that
recognize citizens’ rights and impose their duties’ (Archibugi,
2003, p. 1), the pandemic itself engenders a cosmopolitan/cos-
mopolitical response from transnational institutions such as the
World Health Organization (WHO) and through the circulation
of newly-created shared discourses, protocols, and practices
associated with the crisis (e.g., shelter in place, social and physical
distancing; see Blommaert, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic is an
instance of what Archibugi (2003, p. 3) identifies as one of the
‘elements of which spontaneously escapes national government
control’. Indeed, it was in response to the WHO’s declaration of a
COVID-19 pandemic that the speeches analyzed in this study
were delivered. In that sense, there appear to be two interrelated
and, in some contexts, competing ‘imagined communities’
(Anderson, 1983): the national imaginaire—where the power of
the nation-state is directly imposed and felt—and the transna-
tional imaginaire reinforced by the coronavirus’ spread and
circulation.
The complex links between nationalism and transnationalism
are reinforced by the geopolitical context within which the
outbreak of the pandemic has occurred; that is, in a historical
moment characterized by a rise in populist nationalism,
alongside an emphasis on ‘trade protectionism’ and ‘migration
controls’ (see Bieber, 2020b, p. 190 and Woods et al., 2020,
pp. 808–809).
We regard both solidarity and nationalism to be discursive
strategies of social grouping based upon inclusion and exclusion.
These strategies can be used both complementarily and con-
trastively. Two heuristics guide our analysis: The social con-
struction of political identities in terms of nationalism and
solidarity in the crisis communication reacting to the COVID-19
pandemic, and the argumentative legitimation of political actions.
Contextualization plays a crucial role in analyzing political text
and talk. In this respect, we are guided by the three-dimensional
model suggested by Norman Fairclough (2010, pp. 131–134) that
distinguishes between the macro level (the social and institutional
context), meso level (participants, their roles and practices, genre),
and micro level of a text.
At the macro level, we have encountered a problem concerning
comparative analyses of political cultures and systems. Due to the
limited space of this article, it is not viable to incorporate a sys-
tematic comparative analysis of political orientations and systems
and to critically appraise the existing democracy indexes and their
ideological shortcomings (for more details see Munck, 2009;
Skaaning, 2018).
Regarding the meso level, we understand political speeches to
be a broad, overarching, and heterogeneous genre of political
discourse, inclusive of text types such as a press conference
speech, or an address to the nation. This genre involves pre-
senting ‘evidence, authority, and truth, a process that we shall
refer to in broad terms, in the context of political discourse as
“legitimation”’ (Chilton, 2004, p. 23). In the context of COVID-
19, the legitimation of proposed measures, policies, and repre-
sentations are closely linked to coercion, exercised by political
actors by setting policy, determining topics of discussion, making
assumptions about the future development of the pandemic, and
controlling representation (Chilton, 2004). This is especially
relevant in leaders’ COVID-19 speeches, which are mostly con-
sent-oriented, attempting to garner approval from the population,
and thus associated with the formation of positive public attitudes
towards proposed measures and crisis management process (see
Reisigl, 2008, pp. 251–252).
The research on social categorization as one of the basic pro-
cesses of social cognition and the linguistic means by which they
are expressed is elaborated upon within the socio-cognitive
approach to discourse analysis (Koller, 2012, 2014; van Dijk,
2012). The distinctive feature of the socio-cognitive outlook lies in
inferring the Socio-Cognitive Representations (SCR) from texts
produced in a particular social context. SCRs are conceptual
structures that Augoustinos et al. (2006, p. 42) describe as
‘organized, coherent, and socially shared sets of knowledge about
an object or domain’. Thus, collective identities are seen as socio-
cognitive representations ‘comprising beliefs and knowledge,
norms and values, attitudes, and expectations, as well as emo-
tions’ (Koller, 2012, p. 20).
This knowledge can emanate from different sources, such as
media, the norms, and values of the community on which
expectations are built and evaluations of groups are performed.
Such categorizations lead to the construction of group identities
in discourse (Koller, 2019, p. 71) and the discourse space occu-
pied by them (Chilton, 2014, 2017; Cap, 2017). SCRs are dynamic
and flexible, as they manifest contradictory elements and thus are
not necessarily internally consistent, which may lead to their
change over time (Augoustinos et al., 2006, p. 99).
The basis for the distinction between individual groups, mainly
in-groups and out-groups, is a construction of difference, also
known as bounding: construction of limits and boundaries
(Koller, 2019, p. 71). The in-group construction is based upon
self-categorization, being expressed by self-attribution, assign-
ment of action, motivation, and shared values. Besides in-groups
and out-groups, Koller introduces the affiliated group as different
from the in-group; however, it is ‘sympathetic’ or at least neutral
towards the in-group and it shares, at least partially, some of its
goals, norms, and values. ‘Members of the in-group and affiliated
group are likely to have a positive attitude towards each other.
The phenomenon of affiliated groups can be found in a range of
social, including institutional contexts, including coalition part-
ners in politics or allied nations’ (Koller, 2019, p. 72, emphasis by
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authors). From the perspective of discourse space theory (Chilton,
2004, 2014, 2017) and its application within the proximization
theory (Cap, 2013, 2017), the affiliated group is located within the
in-group discourse space, sharing space and time with the in-
group, but differing on the axiological level, which is determined
by values, beliefs, and ideology (Wieczorek, 2013, p. 215).
Based on the discussion above, we aim to answer the following
overarching research question:
Does the pandemic crisis discourse challenge or enhance the
concept and practice of solidarity, and to what extent is it asso-
ciated with nationalist discourses?
RQ 1: How is horizontal and vertical solidarity linked to the
discursive construction of in-groups, out-groups, and affiliated
groups?
RQ 2: Which of the two interrelated and, in some contexts,
competing ‘imagined communities’ (the national imaginaire and
the transnational imaginaire of the pandemic) dominates the
construction of solidarity in the data, and why?
The corpus
COVID-191 is the latest manifestation of a collective human
event, among which are AIDS, Ebola, and Zika. However, the
relative speed and ease with which the virus spreads have caused a
staggering impact, the range, and severity of which has never been
seen before. Our research performed a comparative analysis of the
first statements by leading politicians in 29 countries in 4 con-
tinents from the Global North, South, and East (see Table 1). In
addition to global and local perspectives, the texts in the corpus
capture initial frames, arguments, and topoi which have been
iterated over the course of the crisis. In addition, we aim to test
the level of interdiscursivity by comparing reactions in a broad
variety of countries. We have not privileged a particular region;
however, we recognize the dominance of texts from Europe and
North America. The composition of researchers meant that texts
from Europe figure prominently (17 of 29 texts), in comparison
to texts from Africa (2), the Americas (4), and Asia (6). Although
the corpus was created via a convenience sampling method, it still
represents a broad sample in terms of political cultures and will
hopefully provide a context for future analyses of COVID-19
discourses, particularly relating to countries not here represented.
We consider ‘leading politicians’ to be the president or prime
minister of a given nation. Of course, different political systems
emphasize different roles. Presidential systems (e.g., Argentina,
United States) confer substantial power to presidents, whilst
semi-presidential and parliamentary systems (e.g., Malaysia,
Spain) confer power to the prime minister. In considering diverse
countries, we selected presidents and prime ministers because
their positions are broadly similar, in that they lead the executive
branch of government. The president or prime minister is a
metonymic spokesperson, being the head of government and
speaking on its behalf. Although we are not here distinguishing
between the speaker as an animator, author, and principal
(Goffman, 1981, pp. 131–40), we are aware of the complex pro-
duction format of political leaders’ speeches (Kranert, 2019, pp.
72–80). We have therefore simplified our analysis, in order to
focus on social representations in the text, thus treating the
speaker as a unified category. The president or prime minister is
the highest-ranking member of the government and is an
empowered representative. Their first statements are granted
symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1992) as they have a broad media
reach and frame the discourse that follows.
The ‘first statements’ explain the state of the COVID-19
pandemic in its initial stage in a particular country. These
statements take the form of speeches or press conferences,
delivered on national television. While the two are different
genres in terms of structure, their purposes and audience are
shared. These statements are an official political declaration on
the COVID-19 pandemic from the government to the popula-
tion (citizens or non-citizens) in the territory. Moreover, these
first statements were delivered shortly after the WHO’s official
declaration of a pandemic on 11 March 2020. 23 leaders
delivered their statements within a week, with 6 leaders doing so
within two weeks. These first statements are emblematic, indi-
cating the very start of a society-wide, government-led approach
to handling COVID-19.
The choice of first statements by leading politicians necessi-
tated creating a comparable corpus of texts for analysis. These
texts were readily available on the government websites of the
respective countries. As such, official transcripts were provided.
Whilst these transcripts contain details of spoken language, other
multimodal features were noticeably absent, such as facial
expression, gesture, and body language. While multimodal fea-
tures are crucial (Ledin and Machin, 2018), the focus of our
analysis is at the textual micro level of the first statements. We
created a corpus of 29 separate texts, one for every country in
Table 1. Besides English (which accounts for four speeches), the
speeches were given in 25 different languages. The examples used
in the analysis were translated into English, which is the meta-
language employed by this paper’s researchers.
Findings
Out-group construction. The selected speeches problematize the
pandemic and the coronavirus which is identified as a threat (see
also Gjerde, 2021) needed to be addressed. The widespread
metaphorical renderings of the virus, particularly through per-
sonifications, make it appear within the social representation of
actors as an out-group, concretely as an enemy. In the repertoire
of discourses of illness, war metaphors are widely established.
Sontag (1989) observed vividly how war metaphors proliferate in
such discourses, and they are widespread in the discourses of
COVID-19 after the pandemic was declared. Political leaders such
as Trump and Macron affirm in their messages that they are at
war (Craig, 2020). War metaphors are also abundant in Singapore
and Malaysia (Rajandran, 2020). In our corpus, the personifica-
tions are often realized through the virus being the object of a
verb construing a PANDEMIC AS WAR frame: The virus needs
to be fought, defeated, destroyed either by the nation in question
(UK, Italy, USA) or the people of the country (Indonesia, Sin-
gapore), but in the metaphorical war frame, it is rarely a global
fight (only in the Spanish speech):
(1) Ypač dėkojame medikams, pareigūnams, kariams, savanor-
iams, kurie stovi pirmose kovos su virusu fronto linijose.
(Lithuania, Skvernelis, 12 March 2020)
We are especially grateful to doctors, officers, civil servants,
the army, volunteers who stand at the frontline of the fight
against the virus.
(2) […] combate frente al virus que libran todos los países del
mundo y, en particular, nuestro continente, Europa. (Spain,
Sánchez, 13 March 2020)
[…] the fight against the virus led by all countries in the
world and, especially, our continent, Europe.
(3) Dans cette lutte que nous menons contre la propagation du
COVID-19. (Côte d’Ivoire, Ouattara 23 March 2020)
In this fight that we lead against the spread of COVID-19.
Other ways of signaling the enemy status of the virus in our
corpus are the construction of the PANDEMIC AS MOVEMENT
and the virus as entering the national space. This is based on the
general concept of a virus spreading through space, a metonymic
construction of space for people.
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(4) Das erste war das Thema der Eindämmung der Gefahr, die
von dem Coronavirus ausgeht. Das Virus ist in Europa
angelangt. Es ist da. Das müssen wir verstehen. (Germany,
Merkel, 11 March 2020)
The first topic was the containment of the danger
originating from the coronavirus. The virus has arrived in
Europe. It is here. We need to understand that.
(5) … что Россия – просто даже в силу своего геогра-
фического положения – не может отгородиться от
угрозы. Рядом с нашими границами находятся госу-
дарства, уже серьёзно пораженные эпидемией, и пол-
ностью заблокировать её проникновение в нашу
страну объективно невозможно. (Russia, Putin, 25
March 2020)
...that Russia—simply because of its geographic location—
cannot fence off the threat. Near our borders, there are states
that are already seriously affected by the epidemic, and it is
objectively impossible to completely block its penetration
into our country.
Some differences in the construction PANDEMIC AS MOVE-
MENT indicate the varying temporal developments of the
pandemic: when it had arrived in Germany and was recognized
as such, Ghana had not reported any cases but was preparing for
a possible entry of the virus within its borders. In this case, the
warning is reinforced by the reference to a sizable Ghanaian
population in Europe, which is affected by a rise in the number of
COVID infections there. The reference to the virus’ presence
there, as well as in neighboring African countries, stresses the
closeness of the pandemic to Ghana despite the absence of local
exigency.
(6) Fellow Ghanaians, as you may have heard in the news,
Burkina Faso, our Northern neighbor has confirmed their
first two cases of Coronavirus infections. Togo to our East
has one confirmed case. Côte d’Ivoire to our West also has
one confirmed case. (Ghana, Akufo-Addo, 11 March 2020)
The construction of the virus moving closer to the deictic
center of the in-group with accelerating speed increases the
urgency of the threat and the necessity to take action.
(7) Meine Damen und Herren warum ist das so wichtig? Weil
wir die Verbreitung des Virus verlangsamen müssen, damit
es in den Spitälern weiterhin genug Platz hat. (Switzerland,
Sommaruga, 16 March 2020)
Table 1 Countries and languages studied.
EUROPE: 17 AMERICAS: 6 ASIA: 4 AFRICA: 2
Germany (German)
Press conference Chancellor Merkel 11
March 2020
Croatia (Croatian)









Speech to the nation
Prime Minister cum Sultan
(King) Hassanal Bolkiah. 21
March 2020
Ghana (English)




























Switzerland (German, Italian, French,
Romansh)
Press conference Group of Bundesräte
(Simonetta Sommaruga, Alain Berset,
Karin Keller-Sutter, Viola Amherd)
16 March 2020
Montenegro (Montenegrin)
















Press conference Prime Minister Boris
Johnson+ 2 science experts
12 March 2020
Serbia (Serbian)









Speech addressed to the


















Press conference Prime Minister Mark















Prime Minister Sophie Wilmès
19 March 2020
Slovakia (Slovak)





Speech addressed to the nation








Speech broadcast by the national
broadcaster
Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis 12
March 2020
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Ladies and Gentleman, why it is so important are because
we have to stop the spread of the virus so we will continue to
have enough beds in hospitals.
The only text in the corpus that does not construe the virus as
an enemy is negationist Bolsonaro’s speech. Bolsonaro describes
the virus as rain (‘It will wet 70% of you’) and compares it to the
flu which allows him to argue that economic problems take
precedence over the health effects, coining the slogan ‘Brazil can’t
stop’.
Overall, the virus is mostly either rendered as an enemy
combatant, or depicted as having entered the geographical space,
or rather discursive space, of the nation-state. In his analysis of
the Norwegian discourse on COVID-19, Gjerde (2021, p. 9)
suggests that the construal of the virus as a war mongering out-
group actor creates ‘a common human identity through the
exclusion of the non-human actor’ and therefore provides
motivation for increased community solidarity. However, the
dominant metaphorical frames in the corpus (PANDEMIC AS
WAR and PANDEMIC AS MOVEMENT) both assume the
nation-state as a frame of reference and source of solidarity. This
is not surprising, as the macro and the meso level of the speeches
are truly national. They are delivered by the representatives of the
national executive and present the protective measures to mitigate
the national impact of the virus. The focus of the community
solidarity on the nation-state is counterbalanced in most speeches
by the recognition that the virus is a global threat and by the
emphasis on the necessity of regional collaboration, construing
neighbors, partners, and global institutions as affiliated groups.
The construction of specific countries or regions as an out-group
is an exception rather than a rule. Indeed, China is sometimes
acknowledged as the geographical origin of COVID-19, but only
US President Trump is clearly communicating it as an out-group.
In his expression, ‘foreign virus’ China is framed as dangerous
and threatening human lives, and Trump demands credit for
‘early action on China’ via a travel ban. Blame for the COVID-19
crisis is then extended to the European Union, which Trump
criticizes for its failure to restrict travel from China and other
affected countries. Similarly, the EU as an institution is
constructed as an out-group in the Serbian presidential speech,
where the EU’s ideal of solidarity is deconstructed as a fairy tale.
The Serbian president extends solidarity, however, only to some
European countries, specifically Italy and Spain.
Cuba implicitly evokes the US as a historical enemy, to
construe the country as a nation at war. The historical experience
in resisting ‘traditional adversaries’ is used to construe Cubans in
crisis situations and invoking the values of humanism as
successful principles that will guide Cuba safely through the
pandemic. This implicit invocation of an out-group is therefore a
more historical topos to illustrate the historical origins of the
values of Cuba.
The absence of specific national out-groups in a great part of
our corpus points to the speakers’ rhetorical aim of uniting rather
than dividing the population. This, however, does not necessarily
indicate unity on a deeper level. As Huber (2020, p. 400) has
observed for the rhetoric of the cholera epidemic and the deeper
discourses of dealing with it: ‘Despite the overarching rhetoric of
universality and brotherhood, the lengthy debates of the early
international sanitary conferences illustrate the difficulties in
reaching agreement’. The controversial topics of openness and
closure, which were also found in the debates of quarantines and
isolations of the cholera pandemic, were yet to enter the COVID-
19 discourse.
The results show that exclusionary reasoning is realized
explicitly or implicitly by means of discursive othering.
Concretely, certain irresponsible or non-compliant members of
the in-group are stringently ruled out. This is a well-known
mechanism that can be found in the history of pandemics (for the
cholera pandemic, see Huber, 2020). Irresponsible members are
viewed as diverging from solidarity norms, convergent societal
interests, shared emotions and values such as discipline, reason-
ing, etc. This kind of discursive construction is related to the
conception of solidarity as an element of particular social
problems or conflicts. As Crow (2010, p. 58) argues, they occur
when ‘it [solidarity] takes the form of coercion on members to
behave in ways that they would not have freely chosen.’ In
essence, the conflict between individual and communal interests
develops.
In most of our cases (23/29 countries), quarantine violators are
not mentioned directly, partly because this was to be reserved for
later stages. For example, in Germany, there had yet been no
quarantine announced. Mostly, the members of the society whose
behavior diverges from what is expected during the pandemic
crisis are viewed as undisciplined and irresponsible. Three
countries (Czech Republic, Serbia, and Argentina) involve explicit
mentioning of those who break the set rules. The Czech Prime
Minister, for example, refers to people who do not observe the
imposed measures as ‘the blokes who are supposed to be in
quarantine':
(8) Frajírci, co mají být v karanténě a klidně si dají společně
pivo u dveří hospod, to fakt nejsou žádní hrdinové. Spíš
zbabělci, kteří si neumí nic odříct. Ani na pár dnů. I když
dobře vědí, že touhle svojí frajeřinou můžou nakazit své děti,
ženu nebo staré rodiče nebo prarodiče, které koronavirus
ohrožuje nejvíc. (Czech Republic, Babiš, 23 March 2020)
The blokes who are supposed to be in quarantine are
drinking beer at the pub’s door together without any
remorse. These are no heroes. These are cowards who are
not able to refrain from drinking. Not even for a couple of
days. Even though they know that this showing off may be a
way of becoming infected and then infecting their children,
families, elderly parents or grandparents who are threatened
by the coronavirus the most.
Both the Serbian President and the Argentinian President
threaten lockdown with potential legal consequences:
(9) Policija će da sprovodi nadzor nad izolacijom. Onaj ko bude
prekršio izolaciju, naredbu o izolaciji, dobiće do tri godine
zatvora. Odmah. (Serbia,Vučić, 15 March 2020)
The police will monitor the isolation. The one who violates
the isolation, the ordered isolation, will get up to three years
in prison. Immediately.
Lastly, there are three countries (Spain, Lithuania and Côte
d’Ivoire) where there are no direct mentions of quarantine
violators, but rather implicit references to what is considered to
be right under the given circumstances (such as ‘disciplined’,
‘responsible’ and therefore ‘brave’ individuals, as in the case of
Spain). This can be interpreted as governmental insistence on
solidarity-related values which are needed to implement govern-
mental decisions. Implicitly, those individuals who are not
responsible and disciplined break the societal need for (and
value of) solidarity in the given circumstances and are stigmatized
as out-groups. Similarly, the Lithuanian PM states that those who
do not show solidarity and do not do what is required are acting
wrongly against disciplined and responsible members of the
society. Importantly, some individuals are constructed as out-
group members by holding onto negative values such as
selfishness and arrogance:
(10) Hay que cerrar el egoísmo en la reacción a las amenazas que
comporta el momento. (Cuba, Díaz-Canel, 20 March 2020)
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We must avoid egotism in our reaction to the threats that
the virus brings about [other countries being egotistic by not
accommodating a British ship with COVID-19 passengers;
the authors].
It is common in these speeches to evoke blame for the
adversaries who are easily recognizable by members of the in-
group. More often than not, these adversaries are usually internal
to the country. In Brazil, Mexico, Croatia, Montenegro, and
Serbia, they are part of the opposition and their goal is to divide
and scare citizens by spreading fake news and disinformation.
Brazil constitutes the most extreme case, where governors and
mayors are said to be damaging the country by closing trade—
they are outcast for acting against Bolsonaro’s strategy of
COVID-19 denial. We can bring a clear example of the
negativism expressed by Bolsonaro in one of his sentences that
was widely publicized in the press, by the concept of “little flu”:
(11) …caso fosse contaminado pelo vírus, [eu] não precisaria me
preocupar, nada sentiria ou seria, quando muito, acometido
de uma gripezinha ou resfriadinho… (Brazil, Bolsonaro, 24
March 2020)
…if infected by the virus, [I] wouldn’t have to worry, I
wouldn’t feel anything or would be, at most, like affected by
a ‘little flu’.
Less extreme, but still stifling opposition early on, we find the
Serbian President claiming that the ‘bravest’ and ‘great’ people
‘who saved us from the hardest times’ (i.e., doctors) have been
attacked, which in the context of other speeches appears to be a
strategy: critical questioning framed as an ‘attack’.
Not only did we find cases of othering opposition to the
government strategy, but we also found some ambivalent
constructions of both businesses and the media in first reactions
to the crisis, i.e., cases where business or the media were
construed as an out-groups in one country, but in-groups in
another. For example, in some countries from the Global South,
such as Ghana and Cuba, businesses are not framed as an out-
group, but as a source of national defense and an opportunity for
strengthening self-reliance. Therefore, there is a clear
government-business alliance that will shield against the virus,
but also against foreign dependency. In Brunei, however,
businesses were in danger of becoming an out-group and warned
not to raise prices to make a profit.
The media was also treated with ambivalence in many
countries. They are clearly vilified only in Mexico (where
attempts were made to frighten people with ‘fake news’) and in
Cuba (since the foreign media is seen as traditionally attacking
and ‘distorting’ the image of the country). In Cuba, ‘big media’ is
accused of either keeping quiet on Cuba’s achievements or
offending and attacking the Cuban government/people. In the
case of Ghana, the media are framed as an out-group, helping to
disseminate the wrong information, which refers to ‘false’
information from unverified or dubious sources. The discursive
construction of ‘proper’ versus ‘wrong’ concerns not just
journalistic standards, but also political goals. In Ghana, the
President asked media outlets to disseminate information that has
been previously proved and authorized by health authorities. At
the same time, the media can be constructed as an affiliated group
inasmuch as it disseminates ‘proper’ (Austria, Ghana) verified
information through trustworthy channels (such as the main-
stream media).
In-group construction. In the analyzed speeches, in-groups are
construed as crucial for overcoming the crisis. The underlying
value for such construction is solidarity between its members.
Solidarity enables members of in-groups to coalesce around
endeavors to manage COVID-19. By this narrative, solidarity is
necessary as everyone in the country must work together in order
to successfully manage the COVID-19 crisis: Political leaders
cannot do it by themselves and need contribution or compliance
from their citizens. The joint population-government contribu-
tion reveals the construal of a vertical and institutionalized aspect
of solidarity (Kourachanis et al., 2019). Citizens are constructed
as in-group members, as the Presidents and Prime Ministers
often address their audience as a unified nation, for which they
portray a common vision in their statements. Such a portrayal
should motivate people who are not directly known to one
another to feel united, in what has been defined as an ‘imagined
community’ (Anderson, 1983), whose members will hold in their
minds mental images of their solidarity. This stimulates the
horizontal construction of collective responsibilities, actions, and
emotions.
At the micro level, the in-groups are discursively constructed by
means of personal and possessive pronouns, noun phrases, and
metonymic references. These speeches, in fact, often address the
audience as a nation, and the nation in many countries is
presented as a team (such as in Austria, Spain, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Italy, the Czechia, the US, Mexico, Cuba, Ghana, and
Côte d’Ivoire):
(12) Tardaremos semanas, pero pararemos unidos al virus.
(Spain, Spain, Sánchez 13 March 2020)
It will take us weeks, but we will stop the virus together.
(13) Österreich ein Team, ein Team, in dem jeder seinen Beitrag
zu leisten hat, gerade in einer herausfordernden situation.
(Austria, Kurz, 13 March 2020)
We as Austria are a team, a team in which everybody has to
contribute in face of this difficult situation.
Similar examples can be found in the Netherlands and Ghana.
The nation-as-team metaphor unifies the population fighting
COVID-19 and solidifies the in-group because it implies their
equal and joint contribution in managing the pandemic.
Presenting one’s country as a team seems to meet the national
imaginaire (Anderson, 1983), as teams are associated with
nations. This can be seen in the values (such as responsibility,
generosity, and particularly solidarity) associated with the in-
groups, which are often named directly and in the association.
(14) Da sind unsere Solidarität, unsere Vernunft und unser Herz
füreinander schon auf eine Probe gestellt, von der ich mir
wünsche, dass wir sie auch bestehen können. (Germany,
Merkel, 11 March 2020)
Here, our solidarity, our reason and our heart is tested, and I
hope we will pass that test.
(15) Het verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel, de solidariteit, de moed,
maar ook het vertrouwen in ons vermogen om weer op te
staan, om sterker uit deze beproeving te komen, moeten ons
meer dan ooit drijven. (Belgium, Wilmès 19 March 2020)
The sense of responsibility, the solidarity, the courage, but
also the confidence in our ability to get up again, to emerge
stronger from this ordeal, must drive us more than ever.
(16) Všetci sme spojení v solidarite, všetci sme si v hrozbe ochorieť
rovní a všetci sa navzájom potrebujeme. (Slovakia, Čapu-
tová, 19 March 2020)
We are all united in solidarity, we are all equally facing the
threat of getting ill and we need each other.
(17) Апелирам до сите граѓани на нашата заедничка и
единствена татковина, да бидеме смирени, да бидеме
одговорни и да бидеме солидарни еден кон друг. (North
Macedonia, Pendarovski, 18 March 2020)
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I appeal to all citizens of our common and unique
homeland, to be calm, to be responsible, and show solidarity
with each other.
In addition to inclusive first-person plural pronouns, expres-
sions such as ‘people’ and ‘citizens’ are frequently and primarily
used in an inclusive sense. Local variations of these expressions
such as ‘compatriots’ in Chile and Spain and ‘friends’ in Russia
can be seen in the corpus. The speech from Cote d’Ivoire
addresses the population with the demonymic form ‘Ivorians’.
Demonyms are also found in the speeches of Austria, Italy, and
the United States, but are criticized in public discourse as
potentially less inclusive (Bieber, 2020a, p. 8).
The speakers name several members of the in-groups in their
statements, including the government and the population with
some units being specified, namely families, the elderly or
younger citizens, and specific professions. In doing so, their key
role in the endeavor against the virus is underlined. Indeed, the
government manages the virus at the national level, with the
population being expected to trust it and adhere to or comply
with governmental directives.
The speakers as the representatives of the governments and
their institutions construct the discourse space, with its deictic
center and thus spatial and temporal dimension, and the
pertinent axiologies represented by common goals and values of
the in-group. The government as part of the in-group is common
to the whole corpus, it is referred to through nouns, such as
Bundesrat (Switzerland), el Estado (the State, Argentina),
Kerajaan (Brunei, Malaysia), Pemerintah (Indonesia, Singapore),
Gobierno (Government, Spain, Chile, Cuba). The only exception
is Brazil, where Bolsonaro clearly addresses ‘the people’ directly.
This points to and enhances the national imaginaire grounded in
the fact that governments as the center of political action are
based on the institution ‘nation-state’ (Ozkirimli, 2020).
Speakers also use ‘we’, a pronoun at times both inclusive and
ambiguous, to conflate government and the population as one unit,
presuming their unity, and permitting the government to act on
behalf of citizens, assuming their support. This can be found in
Austria, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Singapore, Brunei,
Argentina, Chile, Spain, and Cuba. The use of the first-person
plural represents the speaker as a central in-group member speaking
on behalf of the whole group (Wortham, 1996, p. 333), an effect that
is based on the double indexicality of personal pronouns
(Mühlhäusler and Harré, 1990, p. 92). This effect is well
documented for leaders’ speeches in Western democracies (Fetzer
and Bull, 2012; Kranert, 2017) but can be observed in our corpus at
a global level.
These nouns and pronouns are often the subject of clauses,
representing the government’s management of actions and decisions.
The government leads to action and activities in its country because
it has a special claim to legitimacy based on electoral consent
through elections and under the constitution. For example, in the
speech by the Group of Bundesrat in Switzerland the exclusive ‘we’ is
always in subject position in sentences about decisions:
(18) Wir brauchen jetzt auch die Bevölkerung die sich an diese
Maßnahmen hält und zwar die ganze Bevölkerung jeder und
jede einzelne von uns. (Switzerland, Sommaruga, 16
March 2020)
We now need the population that follows the rules, that
means the whole population.
Some of the countries refer to federalism as a government
subcategory which, for German Chancellor Merkel, ‘means
responsibility’, whereas Belgian Prime Minister Wilmès mentions
‘the great union that I have called for, with the will to work
together constructively in the interests of all’:
(19) Deze motie van vertrouwen maakt deel uit van de “grote
unie” waartoe ik heb opgeroepen, met de wil om constructief
samen te werken in het belang van iedereen. (Belgium,
Wilmès, 19 March 2020)
This vote of confidence is part of the “great union” (on a
federal level, CS) that I have called for, with the will to work
together constructively in the interest of all.
Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez thanks regional governments,
whilst the American President Trump mentions federal agencies
and federal health experts, nevertheless affirming that ‘we are
marshaling the full power of the federal government’.
A prominent in-group encountered throughout the speeches
are healthcare workers. This group is composed of doctors and
nurses, who are thanked for their hard work and sacrifice. While
the earlier in-groups require protection, healthcare workers
provide protection because their activities help to curb COVID-
19. The in-group is not seen in Argentina, Chile (although there
are references to scientists and international health organiza-
tions), Indonesia, Singapore, and the United States. In these first
speeches, the President/Prime Minister tries to explain the virus-
related situation, as the impact of the virus has not yet completely
manifested itself.
Related to the group of healthcare workers is the recurring
subgroup of experts, mainly involved within the scientific and
medical fields. They are fundamental to the countries’ leaders
accomplishing their goals of curing COVID-19 patients and
preventing others from being infected. The experts are presented
in different grades of specificity, which can be summarized as
named professionals, institutes, institutions, and unspecified
workers in the scientific or medical field. Thus, there is an
overlap with the group of healthcare workers. German Chancellor
Angela Merkel mentions the German Robert-Koch-Institute and
expert Lothar Wieler. Similarly, the speakers from the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, and the Czech Republic refer to
national experts through their speeches, and they are often
physically present in the press conference. The Presidents of
Ghana and Ivory Coast both mention their national Ministries of
Health, institutes, and research centers.
Experts as part of the in-groups are generally mentioned from a
national perspective, notwithstanding the global aspect of the
pandemic. The representation of this group, therefore, enhances a
concept of localized solidarity: it mainly consists of national
actors. In addition, the strong national construction of the expert
group is a tool for conveying the idea of the in-group having the
competency and/or the resources to manage the pandemic from
the healthcare point of view. Openly mentioning national experts
and institutions in the scientific and medical field is a way of
openly stating support and power at the same time. The only
exception occurs in Chile, where President Sebastián Piñera
Echenique speaks of ‘international health authorities’.
Another state-related and nationally specific category that is
constructed as an in-group is the army; however, it is present in
fewer instances when compared to the experts and is approached
differently. It is true that the military may be mentioned less
because several countries had experienced military coups or
dictatorships, and the mention of the military in relation to
defense may evoke a return to non-democratic governance. In
Lithuania, Prime Minister Skvernelis refers to the army by
thanking it together with others. Here, the army is seen as
cooperating with the government in the emergency, therefore
sharing goals and efforts with the national ‘Us’. The Group of
Bundesräte in Switzerland speaks about the army for its helping
role in ‘social care and healthcare. In the Ivory Coast, the army is
not praised or thanked, but rather called into action by President
Ouattara. The construal of the group of experts and the army,
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00805-x
8 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |           (2021) 8:128 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00805-x
both actors at the national level, reinforces national unity and
solidarity, and thus legitimizes political action.
The family, as the basic unit of society, and its constituent
members are mentioned in several countries. The family is
acknowledged as an in-group in the Czech Republic, Mexico, and
Slovakia. Its role in society is especially highlighted by Mexican
President:
(20) La familia en México es la institución de seguridad social
más importante. (Mexico, López Obrador, 24 March 2020)
The family in Mexico is the most important social security
institution’.
Its actions and decisions, multiplied across families, leave a
tangible impact in steps towards curbing COVID-19.
Within the family, the focus is often on the elderly and the
younger generation. Elderly people are referred to in the majority
of speeches (18/29) of the corpus. They are constructed as
vulnerable because they are particularly at risk of severe illness
caused by the virus, and in need of support from other citizens. In
one sense, addressing both the younger and older generations
symbolizes the age span of the people in danger, meaning that the
virus has the potential to infect anyone, whichever age group they
may belong to. Thus, most of the countries appeal to individual
responsibility in the form of staying home (e.g., Serbia, Cuba) or
‘taking care of ourselves’ (Spain, Czechia). In addition, there are
calls for social or state support, as in Mexico, where the president
asks people to take care of the elderly, and in Argentina, where
the state takes on this role.
The in-groups noted in the first speeches are those that ordinary
citizens would encounter in their daily lives, such as the elderly,
youth, military, and healthcare workers. This evocation of personal
interaction makes it easier to engender a sense of solidarity. The
population is positioned as having a personal relationship with
these groups and depicted as situated within them, interconnected
by shared responsibility for the health of people in the in-groups.
This entails sharing the common objective, namely, to curb the
virus which functions as an impulse in mobilizing horizontal
solidarity in face of the common danger (Kourachani et al., 2019).
Horizontal and vertical solidarity are necessarily interconnected as
the governments (and essentially the whole society) benefit from
the promotion of horizontal solidarity, which essentially reinforces
the vertical solidarity clearly needed in gaining the acceptance of
governmental decisions and actions.
Affiliated group construction. Affiliated groups in our corpus
create discursive alliances with the in-groups and share relatively
close ties with them. Accordingly, the in-groups offer them
support, express solidarity, and provide aid or receive help from
them. In some cases, the affiliated groups of some countries are,
however, a target of criticism in speeches of other countries (e.g.,
EU). For instance, Spain and Italy are seen as countries affected
by the virus towards which Serbia is showing sympathy and
solidarity, even though the European Union is considered an out-
group in the same speech. In general, there are two types of
affiliated groups: geographical and institutional. The first group
encompasses neighboring and/or foreign countries, including
both the most affected by the Covid-19 crisis and countries that
were ‘successful' in dealing with it.
The ‘World,’ as a group of countries, is mentioned to
emphasize the magnitude of the coronavirus pandemic. For
instance, Spain’s President declares that COVID-19 is
(21) …el combate frente al virus que libran todos los países del
mundo. (Spain, Sánchez, 13 March 2020)
…the fight against the virus led by all countries in the world.
Similarly, the ‘World’ is also used as an affiliated group to
emphasize international cooperation by Brunei’s President:
(22) Tetapi kita bukanlah bersendirian, malah seluruh dunia.
(Brunei, Bolkiah, 21 March 2020)
But we are not alone; in fact, the world is with us.
Quite a different perspective is taken by the Cuban President,
who claims that his country is affiliated with and ready to help all
those who may need it. This seems to be the central objective of
Cuba’s foreign relations policy, as the President himself points out:
(23) Esa misma responsabilidad, lo que nos llama es a ser
solidarios, a cooperar con todos los que en el mundo
necesiten apoyo y esté a nuestro alcance darlo. (Cuba, Díaz-
Canel, 20 March 2020)
The same responsibility calls us to solidarity, to cooperate
with all those in the world who need our support, as long as
we’re able to provide it.
Importantly, the construction of coronavirus as a global threat
serves to reinforce the pre-existing alliances between countries and
their foreign policies. This is often done by propping up national
strengths and values. At the transnational level, the expression of
solidarity is more associated with assistance and aid rather than
effective cooperation. Alongside the international organizations and
alliances, the data show that the construction of affiliated groups in
some countries involves foreign citizens and asylum seekers, groups
for whom membership in these nations is sometimes contested.
This aligns well with Kloet et al. (2020) who point out that in a time
in which ‘geopolitical entities are ranked according to their
governance and containment success’, ‘this celebration of biopoli-
tical control does not fall into the classic reproduction of capital but
speaks to geopolitical identification’. Unsurprisingly, the crisis
situation has not only strengthened national geopolitical identifica-
tions but has also reinforced pre-existing geopolitical alliances in
terms of affiliated groups or in-groups.
Neighboring countries are analyzed in terms of solidarity and
mutual aid, as in the cases of Switzerland offering ‘close
cooperation’, and German chancellor Merkel openly showing
support:
(24) Natürlich wollen wir unseren europäischen Nachbarn und
Partnerländern auch in der Versorgung helfen. (Germany,
Merkel, 11 March 2020)
Of course, we want to help our neighbors and partners with
supplies.
Cuba and Chile include other countries as affiliated groups,
based upon how successfully they handled the pandemic. In the
Cuban speech, ‘international experience’ is observed and analyzed
‘systematically’, serving as an example of pandemic management.
In Chile and Croatia, successful experience is further specified:
South Korea, together with other ‘friendly countries’ is given as an
example of successful pandemic management in its early stages.
The institutional type of affiliated groups regards international
organizations, such as the European Union, international health
organizations, and global and regional economic alliances. These
affiliated groups give an insight into the multidimensional
discourse of solidarity and the competing representations of
national and transnational communities. The countries of the
European Union are referred to as ‘colleagues’ by German
Chancellor Angela Merkel. Meanwhile, Austria and Switzerland
allude to European-level decisions and exchange of ideas. In
addition, other instances focus on comparing the national
responses and capabilities to deal with COVID-19 with other
EU members: For instance, Lithuanian Prime Minister Saulius
Skvernelis said:
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(25) Pirmieji Europos Sąjungoje paskelbėme ekstremalią situa-
ciją. (Lithuania, Skvernelis, 12 March 2020)
We are the first in the EU to announce the state of
emergency.
In Croatia, EU and democratic countries, in general, are
emphasized as good examples:
(26) Ohrabruje me na neki način što radimo manje-više sve isto
što rade naše susjedne države, članice Europske unije, od
kojih su neke najbogatije i najorganiziranije države na
svijetu, s najuređenijim sustavima javnog zdravstva, pa se i
tamo potkradaju neke stvari koje možemo nazvati greškama.
(Croatia, Milanović, 18 March 2020)
I am encouraged in a way that we do more or less everything
as our neighboring countries, members of the European
Union, some of which are the richest and the most
organized countries in the world, with the most organized
public health systems, and even there things that can be
called mistakes happen.
A completely different position is adopted in Serbia concerning
the discourses of solidarity and nationalism. The Serbian
President claimed that international and ‘European solidarity
does not exist’, while referring to China as ‘friends and brothers of
our country’:
(27) Ja sam danas uputio posebno pismo, jer mnogo od toga
očekujemo i najveće nade polažemo u jedine, koji mogu da
nam pomognu. U ovoj teškoj situaciji to je Narodna
Republika Kina. (Serbia, Vučić, 15 March 2020)
I sent a special letter today because we expect a lot from that
and we place the greatest hopes on the only ones who can
help us. In this difficult situation, it is the People’s Republic
of China.
This discursive exception must be seen, first, in the context of
the authoritarian ruling style by President Vučić, who decides on
political friends and foes depending on what corresponds with his
political goals. Second, this is in line with the Serbian national
myth of being the eternal crossroad between West and East,
expanding the latter in recent years to China.
The second institution which is regularly cited as an affiliated
group by countries is the WHO. In Cuba and North Macedonia,
it is mentioned as an international authority when stipulating and
sustaining national sanitary measures. In Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire, it is thanked for its assistance and support. Brazil’s
President Jair Bolsonaro, on the other hand, refers to the WHO
General Director to legitimize the country’s strategy against the
WHO recommendations, foregrounding the damage a lockdown
could inflict on the poorest in society.
Via the analysis of affiliated groups, the discursive multi-
dimensionality of solidarity and competing representations of
nationalism and transnational communities can be discerned.
The perception of the coronavirus as a global threat is used to
reinforce pre-existing alliances between countries and their
policies of international relations; each of them aims to support
national strengths and values in the face of the threat. On the one
hand, neighboring and foreign countries are constructed in terms
of solidarity, their success in handling the pandemic, and in terms
of the aid provided. On the other hand, restrictions and
constraints related to them and to their inhabitants, such as the
closing of borders, are announced.
Conclusion
The discursive construction of collective identities and solidarity
in the crisis speeches by the premiers of 29 countries presented a
complex picture, one that can best be described with Wittgen-
stein’s idea of family resemblance:
And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-
crossing: similarities in the large and in the small. I can
think of no better expression to characterize these
similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various
resemblances between members of a family—a build,
features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and
so forth—overlap and criss-cross in the same way.
(Wittgenstein et al., 2009, p. 36e)
These family resemblances mean that the speeches—and the
discourses represented in them—share the main discursive
mechanism, as they react to the same political issue in the same
genre. We can therefore summarize the main global mechanisms
of the first political reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic here,
while the outliers from the prototypical speech point to particu-
larities in the local political environment.
Our analysis confirms Wallaschek’s (2020) idea of solidarity as
a multi-layered phenomenon: In our speeches, it is first con-
structed vertically on the basis of national identity, as these
speeches are given by national political leaders mainly speaking
on behalf of a national government and addressed to their
population. The genre ‘speech of a head of state/government’
targets national audiences and recontextualizes the practice of
nation-states as established institutions reacting to global crises.
The family resemblances are born at the discursive meso level: the
speeches constitute an in-group based around the deictic center of
the national governments. The in-groups need to collaborate to
control the pandemic and minimize the risk for individual
members. The first answer to our research question is that the
speeches draw on a national imaginaire, which is enhanced by the
genre itself, which presupposes the practice of a vertical type of
solidarity (Kourachani et al., 2019). Governments and popula-
tions share a common aim in curbing the virus, and governments
need to mobilize this vertical solidarity for the people to accept
and apply proposed actions and decisions. Governments con-
ceptualize this both as a joint interest (e.g., obligations, based on
reason, expert opinion, and so on) and moral imperative (emotive
appeals, such as to altruism). These results evidence that the
practice of solidarity enables existing societal groups to be
‘repurposed’ in handling a new crisis: in this case, COVID-19.
Various mechanisms support the in-group construction on a
national level and add layers of solidarity. Firstly, the virus as the
common enemy is construed within the national imaginaire: the
threat of the virus is constructed as a national threat through war
metaphors and the construal of the pandemic as a dangerous
movement towards the deictic center of the speech (Gjerde,
2021). Secondly, the portrayal of internal out-groups strengthens
national solidarity based upon condemnation of the rule-
breakers. And finally, almost all speeches refer to social groups
closer to the audience and therefore refocus efforts towards
horizontal solidarity: families, elderly, and children. The speeches,
therefore, communicate a chance for in-groups to come together.
The particular in-groups — that is, population, family, elderly,
youth, military, and healthcare workers — are discursively con-
structed through structures that presume unity and hence con-
sensus in actions and decisions to manage COVID-19.
Of course, the speeches also point towards a transnational level
of solidarity, particularly as they mostly do not refer to national
or regional out-groups. The exceptions are prototypical exclu-
sionary nationalist leaders such as Trump accusing China, Cuba
referring to its traditional enemy in the US, and Serbia doubting
the solidarity of the EU. Affiliated groups in the speeches mainly
reinforce pre-existing geographical alliances between countries
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but also refer to transnational institutions, such as WHO and EU.
The solidarity with the affiliated groups mostly entails the pro-
vision of assistance or aid, but not the promotion of active
cooperation. Indeed, alliance with the affiliated groups supports
national strengths and values in dealing with this threat.
It has been argued that both the contestation of globalization
and the absence of global cooperation may be linked to the
decreasing superpower status of the US, as well as the growing
tensions between the US and China, propelled through a kind of
rhetorical war during the pandemic (Enderwick and Buckley, 2020,
p. 99; Woods et al., 2020, pp. 810–812) and even before it (e.g., the
US-China trade war). It is within this complex geopolitical context
that one must, for instance, understand the US’ disposition towards
the World Health Organisation or choice of ‘Wuhan or Chinese
Virus’ over coronavirus, with implications for the reception of
people of Asian descent in the West. Thus, constructions of soli-
darity at the level of the nation-state—based on assumptions of a
deictic center—becomes significantly entangled with a ‘deictically
organized geopolitical knowledge’ (Chilton, 2004, 139), compli-
cating our explorations of in-group, out-group and affiliated group
constructions in the political responses to COVID-19.
Data availability
All analyzed speeches are available at the OSF repository (https://
osf.io/ug2y5/).
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1 All analyzed speeches are available at OSF repository (https://osf.io/ug2y5/).
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